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NOTES
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES IN TORT
FOLLOWING TARASOFF
The duty to come to the aid of another in danger is recognized
in most moral systems.1 Nevertheless, as a general rule, the com-
mon law recognizes no legal duty to render assistance to a fellow
human in need.2 The most common justification for this dichotomy
' The best-known example of the moral efficacy of aiding a person in peril is the para-
ble of the Good Samaritan. See Luke 10:30-37. Indeed, in discussions of a duty to rescue,
the Good Samaritan principle is invariably used to illustrate the moral necessity of rescue,
see, e.g., Note, Professional Obligation and the Duty to Rescue: When Must a Psychiatrist
Protect His Patient's Intended Victim?, 91 YALE L.J. 1430, 1433 (1982), and state statutes
promulgated to encourage doctors to render emergency aid are known generically as "Good
Samaritan" statutes, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4404 (Smith-Hurd 1978); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 6527(2) (McKinney 1972); see also Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A
Comment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 51, 52-53 (1972).
2 Even though a person could readily extract another from a position of danger without
any risk of harm to himself, because the law has not adopted the moral constraints of com-
mon decency, that person is permitted to stand by and witness the other lose his life. See 2
F. HARPER & F. Jhs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1046 (1956); W. PROSSER & W. KEErON,
THE LAw OF TORTS 375 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The failure to recog-
nize a legal duty is based on the belief that morality cannot be legislated, see Freedman, No
Response to the Cry for Help, in THE GOOD SAMARrrAN AND THE LAW 171, 172 (J. Ratcliffe
ed. 1981), and a concomitant hope that people will feel compelled to assist in an emergency
on the strength of conscience and moral obligation alone, cf. Note, Duty to Aid the Endan-
gered Act: The Impact and Potential of the Vermont Approach, 7 VT. L. REv. 143, 148-49
(1982). The common-law position on rescue is codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 314: "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such ac-
tion." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). This rule applies "irrespective of the
gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected and the insignificance of the trouble,
effort, or expense of giving him aid or protection." Id. § 314 comment c.
Unfortunately, actual examples of people neglecting to help others occur regularly,
thereby keeping in the public eye the absence of a legal obligation. See, e.g., Handiboe v.
McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 544, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1966) (landowner under no legal
obligation to rescue child licensee from swimming pool); O'Keefe v. William J. Barry Co.,
311 Mass. 517, 519, 42 N.E.2d 267, 268 (1942) (truck owner under no obligation to remove
large stone from highway); Sidwel v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756, 759 (Okla. 1955) (companion
under no legal duty to prevent plaintiff from hammering an explosive device). One of the
most infamous examples is the murder of Kitty Genovese. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at
1, col. 4. Miss Genovese was ruthlessly stabbed to death over a 35-minute period while at
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of obligations rests in the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance.3 That is, a party who acts without exercising due care
and thereby injures another may be liable at law for the harm re-
sulting from his misfeasance. In the absence of some preexisting
duty, however, a party who simply fails to act for the benefit of
another will not be held liable for his nonfeasance.5 This tradi-
least 38 neighbors looked on from nearby buildings. Id. Although a simple phone call would
have alerted the police, the response of most witnesses after the event was that they did not
want to get involved. Id. at 38, cols. 1-3. Moral strictures having failed, there were no legal
grounds to compel their assistance. Id. at 38, col. 1.
Not all legal systems refuse to give legal sanction to a duty to rescue. See Rudolph, The
Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REv. 499, 507 & n.21 (1965). A duty to act,
enforceable through criminal sanctions, has been created in the majority of civil law nations,
as well as in the Soviet Union. See id.; Comment, The Duty to Rescue, 28 U. Prrr. L. Rev.
61, 71-73 (1966). In addition, Vermont has abrogated the common-law rule by imposing a
general duty to rescue another from "grave physical harm.. . to the extent that the same
can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973).
3 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c (1965); Bohlen, The Moral
Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 219-21 (1908);
Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 886 (1934).
In addition to the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, various other bases
have been offered to explain the lack of a legal duty to rescue. See McNiece & Thornton,
Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1287-88 (1949). Among these are: 1) the
common-law view of men as independent individualists, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAhms, supra
note 2, at 1046; McNiece & Thornton, supra, at 1288, 2) the laissez-faire attitude that gov-
ernment should only prevent men from harming each other, see McNiece & Thornton,
supra, at 1288, 3) a belief that personal autonomy should not be infringed upon by requiring
one to aid another, see id.; Note, supra note 1, at 1433, and 4) the absence of benefit to the
person sought to be held liable, see McNiece & Thornton, supra, at 1288.
4 Misfeasance entails "active misconduct working positive injury to others." Bohlen,
supra note 3, at 219. The early common law allowed the imposition of liability for injury to
a person caused by an affirmative act of another without any real consideration of whether
the acting party was at fault. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c (1965).
Except in those instances where strict liability applies, however, liability for an affirmative
act is imposed today only where the acting party is found to have been negligent or to have
acted with wrongful intent. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 31-32. The traditional elements of
a cause of action in negligence include: 1) a legal duty to meet a certain standard of conduct
to safeguard others from unreasonable risk of harm, 2) a breach of this duty, 3) a proximate
causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting damage, and 4) actual dam-
age suffered by some other party. See C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 48 (1953); PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 164-65. Negligence is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as "con-
duct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
5 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The commonlaw was slow to develop any
type of liability for nonfeasance because of the emphasis common-law judges placed on pun-
ishing affirmative, wrongful acts. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c
(1965). One commentator explained the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance in
terms of the result for the victim:
In the case of active misfeasance the victim is positively worse off as a result of
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tional distinction has led to a number of morally repugnant deci-
sions,' and a corresponding movement for reform.7
Some commentators have proposed a virtual synchronization
of legal and moral duty." Others have advocated exceptions that
the wrongful act. In cases of passive inaction plaintiff is in reality no worse off at
all. His situation is unchanged; he is merely deprived of a protection which, had it
been afforded him, would have benefited him.
Bohlen, supra note 3, at 220; see also Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 112
(1908).
6 See, e.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 74, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (1928) (defendant who
had rented canoe to decedent not required to aid decedent even though defendant heard
him screaming for help for 30 minutes before he drowned); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69
N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 811 (1898) (defendant factory owner not liable for crippling injury
to hand of trespassing child where defendant knowingly failed to remove child from prem-
ises); Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 319, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959) (defendant not liable for
failing to rescue decedent who had jumped into a trench of water and drowned while defen-
dant stood by). The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide yet another dis-
turbing example:
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching
automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch without delaying
his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty
to prevent B from stepping into the street, and is not liable to B.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c, illustration 1 (1965).
7 See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. If the law is not responsive to the stage of
societal developement, it becomes irrelevant to argue that there is no legal duty, as legisla-
tive action should be taken to impose a duty in line with common decency. Comment, supra
note 2, at 74. Indeed, it has been proposed that affirmative duties should be expanded to
include a "duty of humanitarianism." McNiece & Thornton, supra note 3, at 1289.
8 See, e.g., Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DE PAUL L.
REv. 147, 177 (1980). Professor Murphy argues that it is "socially irresponsible" in this day
and age to take the position that, in the absence of a legal duty, one may act or choose not
to act as one pleases. Id. He contends that newly recognized duties will arise along the lines
proposed by Lord Esher:
"[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once
recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger."
Id. at 148 (quoting Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883)); accord Harper & Kime,
supra note 3, at 886.
Laymen do not understand why the law does not fully comport with morality, for, by
reflecting morality, the law "ministers to an expectation entertained by the majority of citi-
zens." Honor6, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAmARrrAN AND Tm LAW 225, 239 (J.
Ratcliffe ed. 1981). One argument against aligning legal and moral duty is that there would
be no legitimate means by which to draw standards on the extent of liability. See PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 23. The argument that the law should not recognize a moral duty for the
sake of judicial and legislative convenience, however, has been seriously challenged, inas-
much as difficulties in circumscribing the parameters of liability should not foreclose "the
enforcement of obvious moral duties." McNiece & Thornton, supra note 3, at 1289; cf. Pros-
ser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. Rv. 874, 877
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would impose a duty of affirmative action for the benefit of others
in specific circumstances." Indeed, the existence of a "special rela-
tionship" may impose a legal duty where conscience would other-
wise be the only guide.10 Moreover, certain of these special rela-
tionships have been identified in which one person assumes an
affirmative duty to control another for the benefit of a third
party.11
In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,12 the
(1939) (fear of a flood of litigation is pitiful reason to deny a remedy to a meritorious claim).
9 Proposals for limited acceptance of a duty to act for the benefit of another abound.
For example, one argument calls for both civil and criminal liability to be imposed upon any
person who fails to extract another from a situation threatening serious bodily harm when
he had an opportunity to do so "with little or no inconvenience to himself." Ames, supra
note 5, at 113. Another theorist contends that the factors that need to be weighed in deter-
mining whether a legal duty to rescue exists are: "the gravity of the peril, the chances of
successful intervention, the attitude of the victim, and the likelihood that another better-
qualified rescuer will act." Honor6, supra note 8, at 234. Arguing that the success of the
statutory duty to rescue in civil law nations should serve as an impetus to our common law,
Professor Rudolph has drafted the following proposah
A person has a duty to act whenever.
1. The harm or loss is imminent and there is apparently no other practical alter-
native to avoid the threatened harm or loss except his own action;
2. Failure to act would result in substantial harm or damage to another person or
his property and the effort, risk, or cost of acting is disproportionately less than
the harm or damage avoided; and
3. The circumstances placing the person in a position to act are purely fortuitous.
Rudolph, supra note 2, at 508-09.
Dean Prosser has questioned whether liability can be apportioned under a duty to res-
cue in situations where 50 people fail to come to the aid of one. Possa, supra note 2, at
376. It has been suggested, however, that this poses no unique problem in tort law because
liability may be determined by resort to joint and several liability with a right to contribu-
tion among tortfeasors. See Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 262
(1980).
10 See infra note 78 and accompanying text; see also PROSSER, supra note 2, at 376
(fear of creating unworkable rule of universal application has tended to limit liability for
failure to aid another to recognized special relationships); Comment, Tarasoff and the Psy-
chotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 932, 937-38 (1975) (rather than insti-
tute generalized duty to aid others, special relationships have been recognized one-by-one to
carve out exceptions to general rule).
IL See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); infra note 24.
12 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). The plaintiffs in Tarasoff were
the parents of a young woman, Tatiana Tarasoff, who was murdered by Prosenjit Poddar, a
fellow student. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Although the two students
saw each other regularly for some time, Tatiana was not interested in a serious relationship
with Poddar and told him so. People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 753, 518 P.2d 342, 344, 111
CaLRptr. 910, 912 (1974) (criminal prosecution of same underlying facts). Poddar became
emotionally disturbed over his unrequited feelings and eventually sought psychological help.
Id. at 753-54, 518 P.2d at 344, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 912. The plaintiffs alleged that, while receiv-
ing his voluntary outpatient treatment, Poddar informed his therapist that he intended to
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Supreme Court of California broke new ground by holding that a
psychotherapist may occupy a special relationship with his pa-
tient13 sufficient to impose upon the psychotherapist a duty to
warn third parties endangered by the conduct of the patient.14 Al-
kill a woman, whom the court determined was readily identifiable as Tatiana. Tarasoff, 17
Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. The therapist had Poddar taken into
custody by the police, but the police chose to release him on his promise to leave Tatiana
alone. Id. Subsequently, the director of the psychiatric department decided that no further
action was to be taken to commit Poddar. Id. Neither Tatiana, who was away in Brazil at
the time, nor her parents, were warned of the threat made by Poddar. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at
341, 131 CaL Rptr. at 21. Shortly after Tatiana's return, Poddar went to her home and
stabbed her to death. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d at 754, 518 P.2d at 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
Due to the uproar in the psychiatric profession following the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia's first opinion in Tarasof, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), va-
cated 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), the court agreed to rehear the
case. See Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff
for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 294 (1982). After the case was remanded
for the second time, the parties settled before trial. Id. at 295 (citing personal communica-
tion with counsel for the Tarasoffs).
13 A psychotherapeutic relationship has been loosely defined as a relationship between
two or more persons "where one (or more) is seeking help in the solution of a mental prob-
lem caused by psychological and/or environmental pressures from another whose training
and status are such as to warrant other persons confiding in him for the purpose of such
help." Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communica-
tions, 10 WAYNE L. Rxv. 609, 617 (1964). Some states provide a statutory definition of psy-
chotherapist. See Sloan & Klein, Psychotherapeutic Disclosures: A Conflict Between Right
and Duty, 9 U. TOL. L. RPv. 57, 57 n.1 (1977). The California statute defines "psychothera-
pist" as:
(a) A person authorized, or reasonably believed by the patient to be authorized, to
practice medicine in any state or nation who devotes, or is reasonably believed by
the patient to devote, a substantial portion of his or her time to the practice of
psychiatry.
(b) A person licensed as a psychologist ....
(c) A person licensed as a clinical social worker.., when he or she is engaged in
applied psychotherapy of a nonmedical nature.
(d) A person who is serving as a school psychologist and holds a credential author-
izing such service issued by the state.
(e) A person licensed as a marriage, family and child counselor ....
CAL. Evm. CODE § 1010 (Deering Supp. 1984).
14 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The Tarasoff court developed
the following standard: "When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his
profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to an-
other, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger." Id. Providing a warning to the person in danger is only one of several means
available to satisfy this duty to use reasonable care. See infra note 29 and accompanying
text. The court based this duty upon the exception to the common law made for special
relationships. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 315-320 (1965)). The court stated that a relationship be-
tween the therapists and either Tatiana or Poddar would have been sufficient to justify
imposing a duty of care. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435-36, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
However, the court did not make clear what aspect of such a relationship warranted treating
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though vigorously criticized by the psychotherapeutic community 15
and many legal writers,16 the Tarasoff holding has experienced lim-
ited acceptance in other jurisdictions.17 This Note will analyze the
it as "special." See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Soci-
ety, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358, 358-59 (1976). The primary complaint by psychotherapists con-
cerning the Tarasoff opinion is that, in an effort to provide a cause of action where a wrong
was perceived, the court disregarded the impact on clinical practice, and thereby reduced
the utility of psychotherapy for all involved. See id. That is, if therapists are threatened
with civil liability to nonpatients, they lose an element of flexibility in their potential treat-
ment responses and will take the course that best shields them from liability, even though it
might not be best for the patient. See Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia: Psychotherapist's Obligation of Confidentiality Versus the Duty to Warn, 12 TuLsA
L.J. 747, 757 (1977); see also Roth & Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty
to Warn, 134 Am. J. PsYcmATnR 508, 509 (1977) (psychotherapist's decision may be ques-
tioned regardless of which course he takes).
Moreover, members of the psychotherapeutic community denounced the opinion be-
cause it assumed that they were able to predict violence. See, e.g., Stone, supra, at 371-72.
They vigorously denied any such ability. Id.; see infra note 148 and accompanying text. In
addition, Tarasoff was criticized because it intruded upon the confidentiality of therapist-
patient relations. See Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 301, 335 N.W.2d 481, 489 (1983);
Stone, supra, at 359.
16 See, e.g., Merton, supra note 12, at 342 (Tarasoff exemplifies the unfortunate results
that occur when a profession neglects to regulate itself and is forced to comply with rules set
by outsiders); Murphy, supra note 8, at 175 (by relying on a special relationship to establish
a duty to warn, the decision will only impede the ultimate development of an unfettered
duty); Note, supra note 1, at 1436 (application of special relationships doctrine in psycho-
therapist/patient context is not supported by theoretical foundation); Recent Decision, A
Psychotherapist Who Knows or Should Know His Patient Intends Violence to Another
Incurs a Duty to Warn, 7 CuM. L. Rav. 551, 559 (1977) (Tarasoff holding is too broad; court
should have limited holding to a duty on the particular facts).
27 The clearest adoption of Tarasoff in another jurisdiction has been in New Jersey. See
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489, 403 A.2d 500, 511-512 (Law Div. 1979). In
McIntosh, the defendant psychiatrist was treating Lee Morgenstein on a weekly basis. Id. at
472, 403 A.2d at 503. Defendant found Morgenstein to have very possessive feelings about
his next door neighbor. Id. In fact, Morgenstein had told defendant that he had fired a
"BB" gun at her car because he was upset that she was going on a date with her boyfriend.
Id. at 473, 403 A.2d at 503. Nevertheless, the defendant testified that Morgenstein had
never revealed to him an intention to kill the woman. Id. at 473, 403 A.2d at 504. Disturbed
by a failed attempt to obtain drugs with a prescription he stole from his therapist, Morgen-
stein convinced the young woman to go to a park with him, where he shot her in the back
with a pistol. Id. at 474, 403 A.2d at 504. In language reflective of Tarasoff, the court held
that a therapist may have a duty to take reasonable action to protect a third person when
"he determines, or should determine, in the appropriate factual setting and in accordance
with standards of his profession established at trial, that the patient is or may present a
probability of danger to that person." Id. at 489, 403 A.2d at 511-12. In Commonwealth v.
Prendergast, 385 Mass. 625, 433 N.E.2d 438 (1982), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts raised the possibility that Tarasoff will be adopted in that jurisdiction. See id. at
634 n.18, 433 N.E.2d at 446 n.18 (dictum). In Prendergast, the court upheld the defendant's
conviction, despite defendant's claim that he was not criminally responsible for killing his
former girlfriend. Id. at 633, 433 N.E.2d at 445-46. In a footnote detailing the defendant's
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concepts of special relationships and affirmative duty in the after-
math of Tarasoff. By examining the theoretical foundation of the
affirmative duty to third parties, this Note will consider the possi-
bility that this obligation will be extended both within and beyond
the psychotherapeutic professions. This Note will conclude that
further inroads on the common-law rule are analytically justifiable.
THE CONCEPT OF DuTY
It is axiomatic in the law of torts that an action for negligence
can be maintained only if the accused party bore a legal duty to
exercise reasonable care."" But the body of legal duties is elastic.19
As Dean Prosser wrote, "[c]hanging social conditions lead con-
stantly to the recognition of new duties. '20 Indeed, the history of
negligence law involves, in part, a tale of incremental recognition
of new duties owed among men.2' In this tradition, the imposition
various hospitalizations and commitments, the court cited Tarasoff while stating that "[i]t
is deeply regrettable that although many of these hospital records indicate that the defen-
dant was dangerous, and a suicidal or homicidal risk, no one saw fit to commit him involun-
tarily ... or to warn the victim." Id. at 634 n.18, 433 N.E.2d at 446 n.18; see also Petersen
v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983) (psychiatrist liable for injuries to plain-
tiff due to drug-induced reckless driving by patient released from hospital).
18 See, e.g., McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 480-81, 403 A.2d 500, 507 (Law
Div. 1979); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928); Petersen
v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 427, 671 P.2d 230, 236 (1983); see Prosser, supra note 2, at 164.
19 See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) (legal duties are expressive of determination that liability
should exist in a given case); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 478, 454
A.2d 414, 418 (1983) (the concept of duty is no longer helpful as an analytical aid, as duty is
actually more of a "semantic conclusion"). Dean Prosser has stated that "'duty' is not sac-
rosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 358.
20 PROSSER, supra note 2, at 359. The judiciary is expected to enlarge the scope of duty
as novel situations appear. See Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 905; see also PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 359.
1 The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts realized that, in the area of duties
to protect others, "[ilt appears inevitable that, sooner or later, such extreme cases of mor-
ally outrageous and indefensible conduct will arise that there will be further inroads upon
the older rule." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c (1965). Indeed, common
sense seems to dictate that a psychotherapist should have a duty to warn threatened indi-
viduals for public safety reasons, since, as members of society, they should want to protect
society from foreseeable violence. See Sloan & Klein, supra note 13, at 58-59; see also Flem-
ing & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALiF. L. Rv.
1025, 1029-30 (1974) (a "mature sense of social responsibility" suggests that the creation of
a doctor-patient relationship should require the doctor to protect members of the public as
well as his patient). Nevertheless, the extension of duty in Tarasoff has been cited as an
example of how the Supreme Court of California "ha[s] so far departed from traditional tort
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of a "duty to warn" represents another stride toward aligning legal
obligations with moral expectations.22 Since the common law has
displayed an ability to adjust to the changing needs of society,23 it
is submitted that any radical revision of the concept of duty is un-
necessary and unwise. Therefore, any newly identified duties
should be derived from the prevailing framework of tort law.
The Foundation of a Duty to Warn
In articulating an exception to the general rule that one has no
duty to control the conduct of another, the majority opinion in
Tarasoff relied upon the special relationship doctrine explained in
section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.24 Acknowledging
that, under the facts in that case, no special relationship existed
between the psychotherapists and the victim,25 the court stated
that the duty owed to her arose from the therapist-patient rela-
tionship.26 Thus, the court held that it was not necessary for the
doctrine." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 623, 619 P.2d 135, 140 (1980) (Shepard, J.,
dissenting).
Another example of the evolution of a new concept of duty may be found in the rejec-
tion of classifying visitors on land as invitees, licensees, and visitors-each being owed a
different duty-in favor of the general tort principle of exercising reasonable care toward all
who might be harmed. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561,
568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968); Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277, 445 A.2d
1141, 1144 (1982) (dictum); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240-41, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386
N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (1976). In Rowland, the leading case on the issue of landowner liability,
the court declared that the common-law categories served only to obfuscate the question of
duty. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 115, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The majority in
Rowland stated that it "is contrary to our modem social mores and humanitarian values" to
decide whether a landowner owes a duty of care based upon the status of the injured person.
Id.
22 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
:3 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
2' Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Section 315 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 315 (1965). By finding a special relationship, the court
was able to avoid the question of whether foreseeability alone would have been enough to
impose a duty to use reasonable care. 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
23.
25 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
SId.; see infra note 49.
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psychotherapist to have a relationship with both the patient and
the victim.2 7 In finding a duty in the absence of a direct relation-
ship, the court opened the door for the victim's parents to amend
their wrongful death complaint to state a cause of action against
the therapists for neglecting to exercise reasonable care.28
According to the Tarasoff court, this duty of reasonable care
may be satisfied by any appropriate means, including notifying the
police or warning the person whose safety is endangered.2 9 Writing
for the majority, Justice Tobriner implied that this duty extends
only to potential victims who are "readily identifiable."30 Subse-
quent cases in California have made clear that a psychotherapist
will not be exposed to liability under Tarasoff for failure to warn
when, because of the nonspecificity of the patient's threats, the
victim cannot be readily identified.31 This limitation stands in con-
trast with the broader test of foreseeability that normally applies
in negligence actions.32
27 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
- Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The court upheld the demurrers by
the police defendants, holding that plaintiffs had not alleged any relationship with those
defendants that would sustain a duty owed to Tatiana. Id. at 431-32, 551 P.2d at 340, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 20.
29 Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. One author argues that, even with-
out the threat of liability, psychiatrists will act to prevent a catastrophe by making some
revelation or by hospitalizing the patient. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the
Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175, 197-98 (1960). The judgment as to the appropriate
course of action, he argues, must be left to the psychiatrist. Id. at 198.
31 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
1 See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 754, 614 P.2d 728, 735, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 70, 77 (1980) (public officials do not have a duty to warn upon releasing inmate with
violent history when he has made non-specific threats toward non-specific victims);
Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 600, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1980)
(although victim need not be positively identified, he must be identifiable by a "moment's
reflection") (quoting Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
25 n.11). Other jurisdictions have adopted the "readily identifiable" victim standard. See
Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 482, 454 A.2d 414, 420 (1983) (Tarasoff
only imposed a duty when the doctor knows the victim's identity); Sherrill v. Wilson, 653
S.W.2d 661, 666 (Mo. 1983) (court distinguished Tarasoft because there was no allegation
that the patient represented a threat to the decedent). But see Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 194 (D. Neb. 1980) ("readily identifiable" requirement rejected in
favor of duty extending to all victims doctor could reasonable foresee).
'2 See Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 298, 335 N.W.2d 481, 488-89 (1983). The role
of foreseeability in negligence has been defined such that "the orbit of the danger as dis-
closed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty." Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). The distinction between a readily
identifiable victim and a foreseeable victim is that the former must be a person the thera-
pist can identify specifically, see Davis, 124 Mich. App. at 298, 335 N.W.2d at 489, while any
person could subsequently be deemed to have been foreseeable, see PROSSER, supra note 2,
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Growth of the Duty to Warn Within the Psychotherapeutic
Professions
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court of California expanded
the liability of psychotherapists beyond the "readily identifiable"
victim limitation set forth in Tarasoff. In Hedlund v. Superior
Court,s" the plaintiffs, LaNita Wilson and her minor son, alleged
that a patient, Stephen Wilson, who was undergoing joint therapy
with LaNita, had expressed to the defendant-psychologists his in-
tention to cause LaNita grave physical harm."s When Stephen Wil-
son later assaulted LaNita with a shotgun, she used her body to
shield her son, who was in the seat next to her.35 Although he was
spared physical injury, the son averred in his complaint that he
suffered extreme emotional harm as a result of the event.36 In light
of the mother's allegation that Stephen had declared to the defen-
dants his intent to harm her, she-and not her son-occupied the
role of the "readily identifiable" victim. 37 Nevertheless, the court
determined that the boy stated a cause of action against the psy-
chologists on the basis of an obligation to the son that derived
from their duty to warn his mother.38
at 298.
- 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983).
- Id. at 700, 669 P.2d at 42-43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07. The defendant psychologists
asserted that plaintiffs' claim was time-barred under California's 1-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury actions. Id. at 699, 669 P.2d at 42, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806. Plaintiffs,
however, contended that their action sounded in "professional negligence" against a "health
care provider," and, therefore, was governed by a 3-year statute of limitations. Id. at 699-
700 & n.2, 669 P.2d at 42-43 & n.2, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07 & n.2. Plaintiffs' argument was
that the duty enunciated in Tarasoff requires that the therapist realize the danger and then
provide a warning. Id. at 703, 669 P.2d at 45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809. The defendants con-
tended that professional negligence would arise only if they failed to diagnose the patient's
dangerousness; a subsequent failure to warn would then represent ordinary negligence and
would be governed by the 1-year statute. Id. at 702, 669 P.2d at 44, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the diagnosis and subsequent warning are so inter-
twined that the distinction posed by the defendants was not realistic. Id. at 703, 669 P.2d at
45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a claim
for professional negligence. Id. at 704, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
Id. at 704-05, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
'6 Id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
7 Id. at 700, 669 P.2d at 43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 807. The young boy did not allege that
the psychologists were under a duty to warn him directly. Id. at 705 n.7, 669 P.2d at 46 n.7,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 810 n.7.
11 See id. at 706, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The issue, as formulated by the
court, was:
whether a therapist who negligently fails to fulfill his duty to warn an identifiable
potential victim that a patient has threatened violence may be liable not only to
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The risk of harm to the young boy, the majority held, was
foreseeable as a matter of law.39 The court apparently established a
two-tier system for determining to whom a duty is owed under
Tarasoff. The first tier includes the readily identifiable victim. 40
The second tier, derived from the primary obligation to the readily
identifiable victim, consists of those individuals who are harmed in
an attack upon an identifiable victim and whose injuries are
deemed to have been reasonably foreseeable to the psychotherapist
in the event of a breach of the duty to warn.41 Contending that
they are unable to predict when a patient will be violent, psycho-
therapists will surely view Hedlund as an unjustified expansion of
an already unrealistic obligation.42 Examined in light of traditional
tort law, however, it is submitted that the Hedlund opinion repre-
sents a principled amplification of the duty to warn.
the person against whom the threat is made, but also to persons who may be in-
jured if the threat is carried out.
Id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
39 Id. The court referred to the son as "both foreseeable and identifiable" as a person
who might be harmed in the event his mother was attacked. Id. The court determined the
question of liability, however, by referring to the foreseeability of the son's injury. Id. at 706,
669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811. It is unclear, therefore, whether the court would have
reached the same result had the victim been the plaintiff's friend or acquaintance, rather
than son, i.e., if the friend had been foreseeable, but not identifiable, to the psychologists.
See id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. In fact, the majority made clear that
the facts of the case did not require them to decide "whether a duty exists as to all bystand-
ers who might be injured." Id.
40 See 34 Cal. 3d at 704, 669 P.2d at 45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809; supra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
" See 34 Cal. 3d at 705-06, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. The plaintiff
son claimed "that because it was foreseeable that if [the patient] carried out his threat
against [the boy's mother] a risk of harm to bystanders and those in close relationship to
[the mother] existed, they owed a duty which 'extended' to him." Id. at 705 n.7, 669 P.2d at
46 n.7, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810 n.7.
42 See supra note 15. In his dissent in Hedlund, Justice Mosk noted that psychother-
apy has not developed to the point where future dangerousness can be predicted with even a
minimal degree of accuracy. 34 Cal. 3d at 709, 669 P.2d at 49, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk,
J., dissenting); see Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 439, 451,52 (1974); DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug
Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treat-
ment?, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1149, 1214 (1976); Gardner, The Right to Be Punished-A Sug-
gested Constitutional Theory, 33 RUTGmiS L. REv. 838, 854 n.82 (1981); infra notes 148-57
and accompanying text. Critics have expressed the concern that the Tarasoff holding could
effectively result in strict liability for therapists since juries, in absence of a clear standard
for the prediction of violence, will find negligence based on the fact of injury. See, e.g., Sloan
& Klein, supra note 13, at 69; see also Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 23 n.3 (Minn. 1982)
(without tort immunity, threat of liability will undermine treatment at state-run, open-door
facility); Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Mo. 1983) (threat of liability will cause
doctors to resolve all questions in favor of continued commitment).
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Due to the impracticability of a general public warning of a
patient's dangerous tendencies, the duty to warn normally applies
only when a threat has been directed toward a specific individual.4 3
Hedlund does not alter this norm.4 ' Instead, the majority in Hed-
lund acknowledged that if the patient has specified a victim, the
therapist cannot escape liability simply because the person ulti-
mately harmed was not also directly threatened.45 The court ex-
plained: "It is equally foreseeable when a therapist negligently fails
to warn a mother of a patient's threat of injury to her, and she is
injured as a proximate result, that her young child will not be far
distant and may be injured. .... ,4.
In essence, the Hedlund court has done no more than engraft
upon the duty to warn a readily identifiable victim a variation of
the long-accepted tort principle that demands due care toward
those who foreseeably might be harmed by a breach of duty.47
That is, the duty to warn embraces those who are in some way
connected to the readily identifiable victim and who foreseeably
might be harmed if the threat were fulfilled.48 This duty extends to
the foreseeable victims only when the risk of harm to them derives
from their relationship or proximity to the person actually
threatened; they are not entitled to recompense independent of
this relation.4  The majority also implied that those foreseeably
close to the specified target need not be given individualized warn-
43 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
"4 See Hedlund, 34 CaL. 3d at 700, 669 P.2d at 43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
45 Id. at 705-06, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. The son's relationship to
his mother, the court concluded, and the defendants' failure to warn her of her peril were
sufficient bases for a negligence action, see id. at 706, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811,
notwithstanding the defendants' contentions that they owed the son no duty because the
patient had not threatened him, and that he had no right to be warned of the threat against
his mother, see id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
4" Id. at 706, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 CaL Rptr. at 811.
47 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48 The Hedlund court stated that it was reasonable to recognize a duty to people closely
related to the person threatened, since the therapist should take them into consideration
anyway in deciding the seriousness of the threat and the protective measures that should be
taken. Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 706, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
4' The majority analogized the situation in Hedlund to cases in which a doctor treating
a patient with a communicable disease acquired a derivative duty to warn family members
whom he should expect to be near his patient. Id. at 707, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
811; see Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (physician
owes duty to family members of patient suffering from contagious disease); Wojcik v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 18 Misc. 2d 740, 746, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357-58 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1959)
(failure to warn husband that he had tuberculosis was negligent to him and his wife who
subsequently contracted disease).
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ings, because a warning to the readily identifiable person would be
sufficient to satisfy the therapist's obligations to warn. 50 It seems,
therefore, that in the event there is no readily identifiable victim, a
therapist would encounter no new obligations under Hedlund.
Other decisions based on facts similar, but not identical, to
Tarasoff seem to have gone further beyond the readily identifiable
victim limitation."1 In Petersen v. State,5 2 the Supreme Court of
Washington cited Tarasoff and its progeny in imposing upon a
psychiatrist "a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect any-
one who might foreseeably be endangered by [the patient's] drug-
related mental problems. 53 Within five days of being released
from the hospital, the patient in Petersen, apparently under the
influence of drugs, accidentally drove into the plaintiff's car."
Since it was purely a matter of coincidence that this particular
driver happened to be the victim of the patient's negligence, she
clearly was not "readily identifiable" to the doctor when he dis-
charged the patient.5 In this case, the only conceivable warning
that would have sufficed would have entailed notice to all people
within the area in which the patient might foreseeably travel. Of
course, such a course of action would have been plainly unrealis-
60 See 34 Cal. 3d at 707, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The son's cause of action
was upheld on the basis of his relationship to his mother and her allegation that the duty to
warn her had been breached, id., not on the ground that the psychologists owed him an
independent duty to warn, id. at 705 n.7, 669 P.2d at 46 n.7, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810 n.7.
61 See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
62 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
53 Id. at 428, 671 P.2d at 237.
- Id. at 426, 671 P.2d at 235. At the time of the accident, the patient, Larry Knox, was
on probation, the conditions of which required him to seek mental health counseling and to
refrain from using controlled substances. Id. at 425, 671 P.2d at 234. Approximately one
month before the accident, Knox had been hospitalized following an attempt to emasculate
himself while under the influence of "angel dust." Id. at 425, 671 P.2d at 234-35. Diagnosed
as suffering from delusional tendencies, Knox was involuntarily placed in a psychiatric hos-
pital for 72 hours. Id. at 426, 671 P.2d at 235. His doctor learned of his angel dust use,
placed him on an antipsychotic medication, and later petitioned for and received permission
to hold Knox for another 14 days. Id. at 427, 671 P.2d at 235. Knox was allowed to leave the
hospital for one day, but when he returned that night he was found driving recklessly on
hospital property. Id. at 426, 671 P.2d at 235. Despite this incident, the doctor released
Knox the next morning, believing him to be recovered from his drug reaction. Id. at 427, 671
P.2d at 235. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that her injuries were proximately caused by the
doctor's decision not to seek additional confinement and by his failure to disclose Knox's
parole violation. Id..
66 The court made clear that Knox's driving was negligent; there was no intent on his
part to inflict injury upon the particular plaintiff. See id. at 427, 671 P.2d at 235-36.
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tic, 56 and was not suggested by the court. It appears, therefore,
that the holding in Petersen does not imply any expansion of the
therapist's duty to warn.5 7
Warning potential victims, however, is only one possible
means of fulfilling the duty to use reasonable care recognized in
Tarasoff.58 Thus, although a warning was impractical, the doctor in
Petersen was not insulated from liability. The court held that the
duty to use reasonable care to safeguard "intended victim[s]"5 9 can
be extended to any reasonably foreseeable victim.60 Since the court
found that the doctor failed to exercise reasonable care by neglect-
ing to petition for further confinement or take other reasonable
precautions, the doctor was held liable for the plaintiff's injuries.6 1
Petersen and other cases employing a foreseeability test, how-
ever, can be distinguished from Tarasoff in that they involve the
negligent discharge or release of a dangerous person from a custo-
dial setting, rather than a failure to warn in an outpatient set-
ting.62 Thus, it seems that the defendant's degree of control over
Cf. Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 301, 335 N.W.2d 481, 489 (1983). In accepting
the "readily identifiable" victim limitation, the Davis court stated that "[w]e seriously
doubt that a warning to the public-at-large about a patient's threats would be of much
benefit." Id.
57 Declining to mandate a general public warning is in accord with the position of the
Supreme Court of California. See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649
P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d
741, 754-55, 614 P.2d 728, 735-36, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77-78 (1980) (en banc). In Thompson,
the defendant county was aware that a certain juvenile offender had violent sexual tenden-
cies toward young children. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72. Moreover, the
boy had said that if he were released he would kill a child living in his mother's neighbor-
hood; he did not, however, identify any particular child. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant
allowed the boy to be released without any warning to his mother, the police, or parents of
young children in the vicinity. Id. Within 24 hours of his release, he murdered a neighbor's
son. Id. Noting that the possibility of parole violations always exists, the court held that
"public entities and employees have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate
with a violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm directed at nonspecific
victims." Id. at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (emphasis in original). Requiring a
warning or notice to the public, the court stated, is both "unwieldy and of little practical
value." Id.
58 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59 Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 428-29, 671 P.2d at 237. "Intended victim" is the language
used in the standard formulated by the Tarasoff court. 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 20; see supra note 15.
e" Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 428, 671 P.2d at 237.
01 Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 429, 671 P.2d at 237.
62 See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., 429 U.S. 827 (1976); see also Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D.
Neb. 1980). In Semler, the patient's 20-year sentence for kidnapping was suspended on the
condition that he receive treatment while being confined to the defendant Institute. 538
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the patient defines the ambit of potential liability to third parties.
Potential Expansion of the Duty to Warn Outside the Psycho-
therapeutic Professions
It is submitted that, in concluding that a special relationship
exists betiveen a psychotherapist and patient sufficient to invoke
the special relationship doctrine of section 315 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the Tarasoff court neglected to develop a well-
reasoned basis for its determination. 3 The court addressed the is-
sue in conclusory terms, treating the presence of a special relation-
ship as more or less self-evident.6 4 The majority justified the hold-
F.2d at 123. The Institute's supervision of the patient, however, was relaxed and eventually
he was treated as an outpatient, with the restriction that he attend group therapy sessions
twice a week. Id. at 123-24. Six weeks after his release as an outpatient, the patient killed
the plaintiff's daughter. Id. at 124. The court held that the state occupied a custodial posi-
tion akin to that described in § 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, inasmuch as the
patient's sentence was conditioned on confinement under the supervision of the state. Id. at
124-25. By allowing the patient to leave without court approval, the defendants breached
their "'duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from
doing such [bodily] harm [to others]."' Id. at 125 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 319 (1965)).
In Lipari, a patient who was under psychiatric care in a VA hospital purchased a shot-
gun at the defendant store. 497 F. Supp. at 187. Approximately six weeks after abandoning
treatment that had lasted for less than one month, the patient entered a nightclub and fired
the shotgun, wounding the plaintiff and killing her husband. Id. The district court held that
Nebraska would apply the special relationship doctrine of § 315 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts to the therapist-patient relationship. Id. at 190-91. However, the court re-
jected the "readily identifiable" victim limitation, holding that the therapist's duty should
extend to all reasonably foreseeable victims. Id. at 194.
In both Semler and Lipari, liability attached without a previously identified victim. See
Semler, 538 F.2d at 124; Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 193. Although the Petersen court did not
address the issue in such terms, it appears that the duty breached in Petersen, as in Semler,
was the obligation to use reasonable care to control a person who is already in a custodial
setting. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965). Such a custodial relationship is
deemed to be within "relations between the actor and a third person which require the actor
to control the third person's conduct." Id. § 315; see id. § 315 comment c; see also Ryan v.
State, 134 Ariz. 308, 311, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982) (en banc) (any duty owed by state for
injuries caused by youth who escaped custody would likely be based on Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 319); Rausch v. McVeigh, 105 Misc. 2d 163, 166, 431 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1980) (a cause of action is stated under Restatement (Second) of Torts §
319 when one who takes charge of another fails to use reasonable care to control him).
13 See Note, supra note 1, at 1436 (no theory justifies enlarging the doctrine of special
relationships to include psychiatrists). But see Ayres & Holbrook, Law, Psychotherapy and
the Duty to Warn: A Tragic Trilogy?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 683 (1975) (legal propriety of
court's reliance on special relationships doctrine should not be questioned).
1 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24. The court
concluded that "'by entering into a doctor-patient relationship the therapist becomes suffi-
ciently involved to assume some responsibility for the safety, not only of the patient himself,
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ing by the need to prevent "the further exposure to danger that
would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his
patient was lethal. '6 5 Therefore, although Tarasof/ remains a via-
ble, albeit a minority, holding, it is submitted that the basis of the
"duty to warn" is insufficiently explained by relying primarily on
social policy and can better be justified in light of traditional tort
principles.
The duty to control the conduct of another for the benefit of a
third person, where applicable, is an affirmative obligation.6 Those
affiliations in which a duty to control another is imposed are col-
lected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 7 the duty of a parent
to control the conduct of a child,6 8 the duty of a master to control
the conduct of a servant,69 the duty of a possessor of land or chat-
tels to control the conduct of a licensee,70 and, the duty of those
but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to be threatened by the patient."' Id.
(quoting Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1030-31); see also Buford v. State, 104 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 821, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264, 270 (1980) (policy underlying duty to aid "is founded
upon the existence of relationships of dependence or of mutual dependence").
e5 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27; see Sloan & Klein, supra note
13, at 64 n.33. The Tarasoff panel bolstered its reliance upon the special relationships doc-
trine by emphasizing that a duty to warn would help protect the public from violence. 17
Cal. 3d at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26; see Note, supra note 1, at 1436. Indeed,
the court conceded that "'the ultimate question of resolving the tension between the con-
flicting interests of patient and potential victim is one of social policy."' 17 Cal. 3d at 439,
551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (quoting Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1067).
It has been argued that, for society's sake, the law cannot neglect to give a legal backbone to
moral duties, or a "complete breakdown of moral sanctions" may result. Rudolph, supra
note 2, at 499; see also HonorXe, supra note 8, at 232 (if law does not encourage a duty to
rescue, it will surely discourage it).
"See Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 886.
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 comment c (1965).
"Id. § 316; see, e.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 315, 253 P.2d 675, 679
(1953) (babysitter held to have stated claim against parents for injuries caused by child
whose parents did not warn of child's propensity for violent attacks against others); Mitchell
v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 234, 604 P.2d 79, 82 (1979) (parents may be liable for torts
of child if negligent in failing to control); Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90
Wash. 2d 402, 406, 583 P.2d 626, 629-30 (1978) (en banc) (liability imposed on parents if
they have knowledge of child's dangerous tendencies and fail to control them).
6' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965); see, e.g., Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App.
540, 542, 56 S.E.2d 360, 861 (1949) (master liable for torts of servant committed within
scope of employment); Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores, 197 S.C. 263, 267, 15 S.E.2d 353,
356 (1941) (master liable for wrongful acts of servant committed while doing master's work);
Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. 1971) (medical clinic owed duty
of reasonable care to stop any partner or employee engaged in tortious interference with
family relations).
70 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 318 (1965); see, e.g., Huyler v. Rose, 88 App. Div.
2d 755, 755, 451 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479-80 (4th Dep't 1982) (landowner liable for injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff pushed into bonfire on landowner's property); Mangione v. Dimino, 39
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having custody of a person with dangerous propensities to control
the behavior of that person.71 The common denominator in rela-
tions that entail an affirmative duty has been described as the
"benefit principle. 71 2 That is, a positive legal obligation to act
arises from what otherwise would be only a moral responsibility
because the party exposed to the potential liability received some
benefit from the relationship.73
In an attempt to elucidate a conceptual foundation for the
holding in Tarasoff, one commentator, embracing the benefit prin-
ciple, proposed a "principle of professional obligation."74 In es-
sence, this theory posits: by choosing an occupation in which peo-
ple seeking help are likely to be encountered, a professional
App. Div. 2d 128, 131, 332 N.Y.S.2d 683, 687 (4th Dep't 1972) (plaintiff stated claim for
injuries against property owners based on owners' failure to control other guests who threw
plaintiff in pool).
71 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965); see, e.g., Liuzzo v. United States, 565
F. Supp. 640, 646 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (government may be held liable if FBI agent fails to use
reasonable care in directing activities of informant); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and
Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977) (having undertaken custody of vio-
lent criminal, parole board owes duty to the public not to be grossly negligent in releasing
him).
72 See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 3, at 1282. Dean McNiece and Professor
Thornton postulated that a legal duty arises only when a benefit has been conferred, while a
moral duty may arise without a benefit. Id. at 1287. There is no obligation to act unless one
has voluntarily brought himself into a relation that is "materially beneficial to him." Boh-
len, supra note 3, at 243-44; see McNiece & Thornton, supra note 3, at 1282-83.
73 See Murphy v. Godwin, 303 A.2d 668, 674 (Del Super. Ct. 1973). In Murphy, the
court held that a doctor had a duty, ancillary to his normal medical duties, to use reasonable
care in handling an insurance form that the plaintiff patient needed to finalize her family's
health insurance policy. Id. The court found that a duty to act is imposed by social policy in
those relationships in which "the party to be held liable has by some foregoing voluntary act
brought himself into a relationship with others from which he obtains or expects benefits."
Id.
I 7 See Note, supra note 1, at 1439. Relying on Ronald Dworkin's thesis that law sub-
sumes a system of principles and that judicial decisionmaking should not be based on policy
considerations, see id. at 1431-32, one commentator labels the Tarasoff opinion unprincipled
because it fails to construct a reasoned argument to support its designation of the therapist-
patient relationship as "special," see id. at 1436-38. Of extreme importance to this argument
is what the author terms the "liberty principle"; the refusal of the common law to require
rescue because such an obligation violates an individual's free choice to bind or not bind
himself. Id. at 1433. This commentator contends that the Tarasoff court has made ther-
apists the "uncompensated servants of another." See id. (citing Hale, Prima Facie Torts,
Combination, and Non-feasance, 46 COLUM. L. Ray. 196, 214 (1946)). By basing its decision
on policy considerations, this commentator asserts, the Tarasoff court adopted the personal
prejudices of the majority at the expense of a principled, consistent holding. See Note,
supra note 1, at 1432-33; cf. Sloan & Klein, supra note 13, at 69 (without a standard to
measure therapist's conduct, liability for negligent diagnosis will be determined based on
hindsight).
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acquires an affirmative duty to act for the benefit of any third
party he discovers to be imperiled through his professional contact
with his client or patient.75 Stressing the free and conscious nature
of choosing a career, this critic of Tarasoff suggested that the duty
to warn arises from an individual decision to pursue a particular
type of career, since the individual will be able to foresee the likeli-
hood that he will be required to protect others and will be able to
regulate his fees to cover the resultant risk.76 It is suggested that
this emphasis on benefit neglects the primary relationship that is
necessary to justify an extension of an affirmative duty to a third
person.7
The traditional primary relationships in which a benefit con-
ferred on one party will suffice to impose upon that party a duty to
exercise reasonable care toward a second party include those be-
tween: a common carrier and passenger; an innkeeper and guest; a
possessor of land open to the public and the public; and, a custo-
dian and person in custody. 8 In each of these circumstances, the
duty arises because of the direct relationship between the parties.7 9
These "special relations," which require one member of the rela-
75 See Note, supra note 1, at 1439. The "principle of professional obligation" resolves
the implications for the liberty principle that the author finds unresolved in Tarasoff:
"When a person enters an occupation in which he can reasonably expect to face an in-
creased probability of discovering a helpless or endangered person, he is required to take
steps to protect identified endangered persons." Id. The voluntary nature of selecting one
career over another addresses the liberty issue in that the choice to take on an obligation to
third parties is purely voluntary. See id.
76 Id. The author analyzes business or professional relationships in which an affimative
duty overrides the liberty principle, and concludes that they arise:
because the service-provider 1) has made a general choice about how to exercise
his labor by entering a trade, 2) reasonably can foresee that other people will need
particular forms of affirmative protection associated with the running of that busi-
ness, and 3) can adjust his compensation to cover the costs (risks) of providing
that protection.
Id. Therefore, under this commentator's theory, an affirmative duty would flow to a third
person as a result of the first person's decision to realize an economic benefit by pursuing a
certain livelihood.
77 It should be noted that imposing an affmative duty to act simply because the per-
son has chosen a career in which he will encounter troubled individuals is no less a social
policy decision than the Tarasoff rationale.
78 See RESTATEmEN (SEcoND) OF Tons § 314A (1965); McNiece & Thornton, supra
note 3, at 1273-82. The four special relations listed above, however, "are not intended to be
exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the
aid or protection of another may be found." RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF TonTS § 314A com-
ment b (1965); see also 2 F. HwER & F. JAms, supra note 2, at 1048-49. Clearly, the
Restatement contemplates that these exceptions will be extended as circumstances require.
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 comment c (1965).
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tionship to act to protect the other, are thus distinguishable from
those previously mentioned relationships that are deemed to im-
pose upon one party a duty to control the conduct of another for
the good of a third person.1s In the latter situation, the duty flows
to a party who is indirectly related to the person under the duty.s
Acceptance of the "principle of professional obligation" would jus-
tify imposing a duty to protect a third person, not as the indirect
beneficiary of a preexisting primary relationship of control, but
rather as the direct beneficiary of an obligation supposedly as-
sumed by all people who choose certain occupations . 2
Notwithstanding criticism of the rationale in Tarasoff, it is
suggested that the basis of a duty to warn can nevertheless be
properly supported by reference to the "special relationship" doc-
trine. The psychotherapist-patient relationship is fiduciary in na-
ture."3 As a fiduciary, the therapist occupies the position of a
trusted adviser.s He is required to act with the "utmost good
faith" in regard to matters concerning his patient,"5 always consid-
ering the best interests of the patient."8 By exercising reasonable
" See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
81 In the special relationship between a parent and child, see supra note 68, the par-
ent's duty to control the child under certain conditions is the result of their direct relation-
ship, which gives rise to a duty that flows to the third party as an indirect beneficiary of the
primary relation, see PROSSER, supra note 2, at 914-15.
82 The "principle of professional obligation" would have duty run directly to the
threatened person because the psychiatrist chose to be a psychiatrist, not because the psy-
chiatrist was treating a distraught, violent patient. See Note, supra note 1, at 1441 (pa-
tient's intended victim, whose peril is revealed because of purposeful action by psychiatrist,
is person to whom duty is owed).
83 See, e.g., Wade, Public Responsibilities of the Learned Professions, 21 LA. L. Rsv.
130, 131 (1960); Comment, The Patient-Physician Relationship: Present Law and Trends
for the Future Implied in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 320, 333 (1973).
"' See Christison v. Jones, 83 I App. 3d 334, 335, 405 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1980). It is fre-
quently argued that, due to the sensitive, personal nature of the information conveyed by a
patient to a psychotherapist, the maintenance and preservation of a relationship of trust
between the two is of supreme importance to the success of any treatment. See, e.g., Sloan
& Klein, supra note 13, at 60 (because trust is the essence of psychotherapeutic treatment,
confidentiality is even more important than in the usual physician-patient relationship);
Slovenko,'supra note 29, at 184 (more than any other physician, a psychiatrist must main-
tain his patient's confidences); Note, supra note 15, at 755 (assurance of confidentiality in a
psychotherapeutic setting has a curative effect).
8 See Wade, supra note 83, at 131-32; Comment, supra note 83, at 333.
"' See H. REUSCHLEiN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP 121 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 13 comment a (1958) (by
agreeing to act for the principal, the agent becomes a fiduciary, which imposes a duty, "cre-
ated by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected
with his undertaking").
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES
care to control his patient or to warn the intended victim, a thera-
pist diminishes the likelihood that the patient will carry out his
threat.8 7 Preventing the patient from committing a criminal act is
undoubtedly in the patient's best interest, as it saves the patient
from criminal liability, social opprobrium, and increased emotional
suffering.ss In addition, a warning is less obtrusive on the patient's
liberty than involuntary commitment.89 Thus, a knowing failure to
act on the part of the therapist can be construed as a breach of his
fiduciary obligations.90
A fiduciary relationship is clearly a special relation in the eyes
of the law. However, for a special relationship to satisfy all the ele-
ments of section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it also
must be one that "imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct." ' Therefore, for the law to impose a duty
87 The Tarasoff court left the means of controlling the patient to the discretion of the
therapist. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. Thus, a
warning is not required in all instances. See id. Implicit in the rationale of the court, how-
ever, was the assumption that if the therapist had conveyed to Tatiana the danger she
faced, she could have acted to protect herself. See id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 21. For example, the court stated:
the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence
unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that
he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient
to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger.
Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (emphasis added).
One commentator, pointing out that no form of treatment has been shown to be partic-
ularly effective in diminishing violent behavior, has argued that, because much of the pro-
gress made in psychiatric consultations "is due to the passage of time rather than the ther-
apy itself," a duty to warn, since it will prolong the therapy, may promote public safety
better than total protection of psychiatrist-patient confidentiality. Comment, supra note 10,
at 949.
" See, e.g., Comment, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F.L. REy. 405, 434
(1973). A duty to warn, in some instances, "might protect the patient himself from carrying
out bad impulses and thereby exacerbating his condition." Id. Indeed, it has been argued
that strict confidentiality should give way when there is a distinct threat, because the pa-
tient who discloses his intentions to the therapist generally hopes that the therapist will
protect the patient from himself and others from the patient. See Slovenko, Psychotherapy
and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 375, 393 (1975). If the disclosure averts threatened
physical injury, "[s]ooner or later, [even] the patient ... will come to realize that the doc-
tor has acted in his interest." Slovenko, supra note 29, at 198.
89 See Note, Untangling Tarasoff: Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 207 (1977) (standard for warning should be less than for seeking com-
mitment, since there is no loss of liberty when only a warning is given).
90 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. For the fiduciary to be held liable for
failure to give a warning, it is submitted, the information giving rise to that duty must have
been received within the scope of his representation or treatment of the patient.
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 315(a) (1965).
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on a psychotherapist to control a patient that would inure to the
benefit of a third party, it appears that the psychotherapist must
have "a special power to control" his patient.9 2 Historically, the
instances in which a third party has an action for the failure of one
person to exercise control over another embrace relationships con-
taining just such a peculiar ability to control 3 For instance, a par-
ent may be liable for neglecting to control his child when he has
the ability to control the child and is aware of the opportunity and
necessity for exercising that ability.9 4 Proponents of a paternalistic
role for professionals often liken the affiliation of physician and
patient to that of parent and child.9 5 Although this analogy is not
completely apposite, the nature of the control practiced by a physi-
cian is in many respects similar to that asserted by a parent.96 This
peculiar ability of a physician to control his patient, it is suggested,
is cognizable on both practical and theoretical grounds.
On the practical level, physician-patient relationships histori-
:2 See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 914-15.
3 See Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu, 61 Hawaii 253, 258, 602 P.2d 532, 537-38
(1979). An actor's duty to control another because of their relationship, the Seibel court
explained, is founded in the ability of the actor to foresee risk posed by the other and to act
to prevent it by exercising "de facto or de jure custody or control" over the other. Therefore,
although parents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their children, see PROSSER, supra
note 2, at 912, they may be liable for their own negligence in failing to exercise reasonable
care in controlling the child under certain conditions, see Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at
893.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). In Davis v. DuBosch, 283 Or. 363, 583
P.2d 1133 (1978), the plaintiffs, citing § 316 of the Restatement, alleged that the defendants,
parents of the drunk driver who had killed the plaintiffs' son, had failed to use the reasona-
ble care to curtail their boy's drinking that was necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of
harm to third parties. Id. at 363, 583 P.2d at 1134-35. Plaintiffs did not recover on their
claim, however, because they failed to make the essential allegations that defendants knew
they had the ability to control their child and knew of the need to exert that control. Id. at
364, 583 P.2d at 1135. Nevertheless, even if these allegations are properly made, a parent is
not responsible for controlling conduct that is beyond his or her ability to control. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 comment a (1965); see also supra note 68 and accom-
panying text.
95 See, e.g., Hanley & Grunberg, The Client and the Practitioner (Medicine), in
PROFESSONALIZATION 203, 204 (1966) (stereotype of "omnipotent doctor" is one who treats
all his patients as children); cf. R. RUBENSTEIN & H. LASSWELL, THE SHARING OF POWER IN A
PSYCHIATRmIC HOSPITAL 5 (1966) (doctors justify their tremendous control over the lives of
patients "by describing the mentally ill as fragile, childlike, irresponsible, and dangerous to
themselves and others").
96 The physician, like a parent, possesses knowledge and experience not held by the
patient (child). See Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535-36 (1970). The analogy is not complete, how-
ever, due to the limited function a doctor plays, i.e., dealing with health problems, as op-
posed to the general role played by a parent. Id.
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cally have involved autonomous decisionmaking by the physician
and passive acquiescence in a course of treatment by the patient.97
This model is one manifestation of a broader philosophy whose ad-
herents contend that the traditional professionals-doctors and
lawyers-must be allowed to make decisions for their patients and
clients because only they possess the special knowledge necessary
to make the correct choices.9 8 Taken to the extreme, this view al-
lows the doctor to make all judgments in the treatment process.99
Moreover, even when the patient is permitted a choice among sev-
eral alternative forms of treatment, he must rely on the doctor's
explanation or recommendation as to which form will be most
efficacious.100
In recognition of the doctor's fundamental power over pa-
tients, many jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of informed
consent.10 1 Stated simply, no treatment may be undertaken on be-
half of a patient without consent, given with full knowledge of all
the options.1 0 2 Still, informed consent is not an absolute necessity
" The traditional model of doctor-patient relations has been dubbed the "Model of
Activity-Passivity." Szasz & Hollender, A Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine, 97
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 585, 586 (1956). Within this framework, the physician diagnoses
and treats; the patients receive the physician's ministrations. Id. In the opinion of the au-
thors who labelled this model, this type of therapeutic interaction remains valuable in cer-
tain circumstances. Id. at 591.
98 See, e.g., Becker, The Nature of a Profession, in 2 EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS:
THE SIXTY-FIRST YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION 27, 38-
39 (N. Henry ed. 1962). A professional relationship in our society demands that the client
stand back and accord the professional autonomous control over the subject matter of the
representation. Id.; see also PROFESSIONALIZATION, supra note 95, at 197 (editorial commen-
tary) (client often cannot define his own needs and, therefore, must be directed by a profes-
sional in position of authority); Note, supra note 96, at 1537 & n.12 (authors with sociologi-
cal perspective have favored professional relationship in which the professional takes charge
as the optimum means of furthering the client's interests).
I See Szasz & Hollender, supra note 97, at 586.
100 See E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ECONOUCS OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 4 (1967). Rayack posits: "The consumer has no way of
knowing which alternative is best for him-he must rely upon his faith in the integrity and
competence of the physician." Id. Even those psychiatrists who believe the patient should
have a participatory role in the treatment process, see, e.g., R. RUBENSTEIN & H. LASSWELL,
supra note 95, at 5-6, do not deny that the therapist must assume a leadership role. See D.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIRNT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 10-11 (1977). Rather, "[t]hey point out
that the psychotherapist knows more about the 'wider context' of the patient's illness than
the patient knows himself and that this knowledge must be used to lead the patient to the
point where he can assume effective responsibility." Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
101 For a synopsis of those states that have enacted informed consent statutes, see Spie-
gel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 47 n.26 (1979).
102 See id. at 42; Comment, supra note 83, at 328-29.
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in all cases. A doctor is not required to obtain consent when he
determines, in the exercise of his professional discretion, that dis-
closure in a given instance would not be in the patient's best inter-
ests.103 The doctor, therefore, has great control over the flow of in-
formation to the patient even within the strictures of informed
consent.
10 4
If the fact of control is acknowledged, the issue then becomes:
Does the physician have an obligation to control his patient? Al-
though it is impossible to formulate a generalization to encompass
all relationships,10 5 a physician may, in certain instances, have a
duty to control a patient in furtherance of the patient's best inter-
ests. For example, one psychiatrist, discussing the "right to refuse
treatment," acknowledged that there are occasions "when the in-
voluntary administration of treatment is life-saving or so impor-
tant in restoring full health that there must be some provision
which allows the physician to override a refusal of treatment
... .M1o In other words, given extreme circumstances, the psychi-
atrist must control the patient and decide what is best for him,
despite direct opposition by the patient.10 7 A credible threat to
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(b)(3) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2805-d 4(d) (McKinney 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
In Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), the
court explained that an exception was necessary because "patients occasionally become so ill
or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or complicate or
hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient." 464 F.2d
at 789; see also Taber v. Riordan, 83 IM. App. 3d 900, 904, 403 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (1980);
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979).
104 Many commentators caution that the privilege of nondisclosure must be carefully
circumscribed in order to prevent a paternalistic attitude on the part of the doctor from
negating the purpose of informed consent. See, e.g., Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Con-
sent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 628, 642 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent: The Illu-
sion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503, 504-05 (1974). Nevertheless, these same com-
mentators admit that in certain circumstances a doctor must, in the best interests of the
patient, have the power to deny information to that patient. See Waltz & Scheuneman,
supra, at 642-43; Comment, supra, at 521.
105 See PROnSSIONALIZATON, supra note 95, at 225 (editorial commentary) (each pro-
fessional and each client will interact in a unique manner); Szasz & Hollender, supra note
97, at 592 ("different types of doctor-patient relationships are necessary and appropriate for
various circumstances").
106 Arons, Working in the "Cuckoo's Nest": An Essay on Recent Changes in Mental
Health Law and the Changing Role of Psychiatrists in Relation to Patient and Society, 9
U. TOL. L. REv. 73, 91 (1977).
107 Involuntary commitment statutes are perhaps the clearest illustration of the state
policy judgment that a patient's desires must be superseded by the interests of society and
indeed of the patient himself. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALn. L. Rav. 693, 695 (1974); see also T.
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cause serious bodily injury or death to a third person certainly in-
volves extreme circumstances.110  The therapist may wish to inform
the patient of his intention to warn the target and, if possible, ob-
tain the patient's consent.109 However, in the event the patient
withholds his consent, or the therapist determines it would be bet-
ter not to disclose the warning to the patient, it is submitted that
the therapist must, as a function of the control afforded him by the
special fiduciary relationship, exercise reasonable care to protect
the potential victim. 1 0
SzAsz, LAw, LIERTY, AND PSYcHIATRY 40 (1963) ("[t]ruly voluntary hospitalization is virtu-
ally nonexistent in public mental institutions in the United States").
108 See Slovenko, supra note 88, at 392. Professor Slovenko believes that Tarasoff will
not have a great impact on the psychotherapeutic community because the facts of the case
are extreme and unusual. Id. Indeed, he states that "the decision does not drastically affect
the psychiatrist as it has long been the general practice to discreetly warn appropriate indi-
viduals or law enforcement authorities when a patient presents a distinct and immediate
threat to someone." Id. at 392-93; see also Comment, supra note 10, at 951 (Tarasoff is not
likely to result in an increase in warnings because the threat of financial liability is not a
greater inducement to warn than the desire to protect a life). In the context of involuntary
civil commitment, two commentators have noted that "[t]he kinds of behaviors that rise to
the level of dangerousness must be fairly extreme in nature, imminent, and probable." Roth
& Meisel, supra note 15, at 509. It is submitted, therefore, that the liability resulting from
the recently imposed duty to warn will not be unduly burdensome if only because the in-
stances of a truly credible threat are so infrequent. Cf. Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California: The Psychotherapist's Peril, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 155, 166 (1975)
(therapist should only choose to warn "on infrequent occasions when there is an apparent
reality to the threat... and where continued therapy is not likely to lessen the probabili-
ties of violence").
109 See Roth & Meisel, supra note 15, at 511 ("[s]ome patients, when apprised of the
psychiatrist's fears and necessity to act to protect others, are willing to warn potential vic-
tims"). Slovenko asserts: "A patient in treatment has the right to expect from his therapist
a rescue intervention in the face of realistic danger. To be the perpetrator of a homicide is
one of the most self-destructive actions one can take." Slovenko, supra note 88, at 393 n.59
(quoting Tanay, Psychiatrist News, April 16, 1975, at 2); cf. Note, supra note 108, at 164-65
(patients who assert they will commit a crime rarely follow through with that assertion, but
rather, are calling for help) (quoting Godstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The
GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CoNN. B.J. 175, 188 (1962)).
11 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20; McIntosh v.
Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489-90, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (Law Div. 1979); cf. Ellis v.
D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953). In Ellis, the plaintiff was a babysitter
who was attacked by defendant's child the first time she worked for the defendant. 116 Cal.
App. 2d at 314, 253 P.2d at 679. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew of the child's
propensity for violent behavior from past occurrences and neglected to inform the plaintiff.
Id. In overruling defendant's demurrer, the court recognized that a parent could be liable
for his or her own negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care to prevent the child from
injuring another. Id.; see also Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 197 Misc. 791, 791-93, 95 N.Y.S.2d 856,
857-58 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) (parent liability situations), af'd, 277 App. Div. 1061, 100
N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1950). It is submitted that the analogous special relationship of
control between a therapist and patient should properly be held to demand the same exer-
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A therapist should not be burdened with a duty to control
solely because, as a fiduciary, he has an ability to control; his role
as fiduciary must carry a benefit for him."" Thus, a therapist will
not be subjected to a risk without receiving some compensation in
exchange. 1 12 In addition, he will be able to regulate the parameters
of his liability, inasmuch as he is free to choose not to enter a
fiduciary relationship with a given patient." s
Therefore, it is submitted, the proper basis for the duty to
warn enunciated in Tarasoff is found when there is a special,
fiduciary relationship that affords a peculiar ability to control the
patient and is also beneficial to the psychotherapist. In this vein,
this Note proposes the following standard for the duty to warn:
1) A special, fiduciary relationship must exist, imposing upon the
fiduciary a duty to act in the party's best interest;
2) The fiduciary must be receiving a benefit for his services;
3) The fiduciary relationship must be one that creates a peculiar
ability to control the party's affairs;
4) The fiduciary must know of the need to exercise this control
for the benefit of a readily identifiable third party;
5) The threat against the third party must become manifest to
the fiduciary within the scope of his representation.
This proposal provides a framework for the duty to warn that ad-
heres to the traditional tort principles of imposing a duty to con-
trol when a special relationship imparting a peculiar ability to con-
trol exists, and of acknowledging an affirmative obligation when
the burdened party is receiving a benefit.
cise of reasonable care for the protection of third parties.
"I See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
11 The benefit flowing to the fiduciary need not be provided by the patient or person
asserting the right. See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 3, at 1283; cf. Note, supra note 1,
at 1440 n.55 (addressing a similar issue in relation to the principle of professional obliga-
tion). Thus, a therapist paid by an outside source would be held to the same standard as a
therapist paid directly by an individual client. By requiring that the therapist receive a
benefit from the relationship, the law will place the therapist in an analogous position with
others who are burdened with an affirmative duty to control. See Bohlen, supra note 3, at
243-44. Indeed, the only such relation in which a material benefit is not present to the bur-
dened party is in the duty to control the conduct of a child. See id. at 243. Even so, the
decision to raise a child evidences a freely exercised choice to become a parent and to take
on an affirmative duty to control. See id.
"1 It is submitted that the voluntariness of the therapist-patient relationship satisfies
the liberty principle. See supra note 74. That is, by deciding to treat a particular patient,
the therapist has freely chosen to expose himself to the possibility that the course of treat-
ment may place him in a situation where he will have to give a warning. Cf. Note, supra
note 1, at 1440-41.
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Although a factual determination would have to be made in
each case, several groups other than psychotherapists might fall
within these guidelines. 114 It is suggested, however, that a duty to
warn outside the psychotherapeutic professions is most likely to
arise under the standard proposed by this Note in the context of
an attorney-client relationship.1 5 The relationship of attorney and
114 See, e.g., Sewell v. Ladd, 158 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (priest and peni-
tent among relationships readily deemed to be fiduciary); Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247,
253 (Tex. 1962) (fiduciary relationship may arise from informal moral or personal relation-
ships if facts of relation justify such a finding). Proper application of the proposed standard
would require the trier of fact to determine: 1) whether the fiduciary actually possessed a
peculiar ability to control in the relationship, 2) whether the fiduciary knew of the need to
act in light of the particular facts, and 3) whether the fiduciary failed to exercise reasonable
care to control his charge by warning the threatened victim, or by taking some other protec-
tive action. The possibility that a duty to warn may be extended to include groups other
than psychotherapists has been suggested by several commentators. See, e.g., Merton, supra
note 12, at 284 (following Tarasoff, there was pressure to impose a duty on attorneys to
disclose confidences to protect third parties); Sloan & Klein, supra note 13, at 71-72; Note,
Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists-A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profes-
sion, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 283, 308-09 (1977) (potential negative ramifications of extension of
duty to warn).
One example of a relationship that could give rise to a duty to warn is that between
cleric and penitent. Cf. Sewell v. Ladd, 158 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942). If, it is
suggested, a cleric acts as a counselor, rather than a confessor, he may possess sufficient
control over a person to justify imposing an affirmative obligation for the benefit of third
parties. Indeed, it is readily conceivable that a priest or minister could fall within the defini-
tion of a psychotherapist. See supra note 13. The priest-penitent privilege would not bar
disclosure of a threat since, as with the physician-patient privilege, the privilege only bars
disclosure in a judicial setting. See Note, The Dangerous Patient Exception and the Duty
to Warn: Creation of a Dangerous Precedent?, 9 U.C.D. L. REv. 549, 558-59 (1976); see also
Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doc-
tor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 616-17 (1943).
Although Roman Catholic priests are strictly forbidden from revealing the secrets of the
confessional, see IV. TEMANN, Tan RIGHT TO SILENCE 19-20 (1964), credible threats made in
other circumstances could give rise to a duty to warn if the facts establish that a "special
relationship" exists. Cf. Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications
Privileges, 77 HAIv. L. REV. 730, 733-34 (1964) (if priest unable to prevent antisocial act,
"he may feel authorized or even compelled to reveal his knowledge in order to prevent the
offense").
"ll At least one plaintiff has attempted to hold a lawyer liable for the failure to warn
readily identifiable victims of potential violence from a client. See Hawkins v. King County,
24 Wash. App. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 361, 365-66 (1979). In Hawkins, an attorney sought to
have his client released on bail despite warnings from the client's mother and a psychiatrist
that he was dangerous. Id. at 340, 602 P.2d at 363. The attorney made no mention of these
warnings at the bail hearing, and shortly after his client was released, the client attacked his
mother and attempted suicide. Id. The court, however, distinguished Tarasoff, and rejected
the mother's claim against the attorney, noting that the client's mother was aware of his
dangerousness and release, id. at 343, 602 P.2d at 365, and that the lawyer had no notice
from the client of any violent intentions, id. at 344, 602 P.2d at 365-66.
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client is clearly fiduciary in nature." 6 Accordingly, within the
scope of his representation, an attorney is bound to act in the best
interests of his client.11  Like the physician, the attorney's position
vis-a-vis his client entrusts him with a peculiar ability to assert
control.11 8
In order for a duty to warn third parties to arise out of the
attorney's fiduciary role, it must be demonstrated that attorneys
have an ability to control their clients similar to the ability as-
serted by physicians and other parties deemed to be subject to the
same duty.119 Again, it is submitted that this ability to control may
be found on both a practical and a theoretical plane.
On the practical level, the historical model of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship assumes that the client will bring his problem to
the lawyer and then abdicate any further responsibility on how
best to handle his affairs.1 20 The argument has been made that the
unique language and technical procedure so essential to the law
make it virtually impossible for a layman to direct his own legal
affairs competently.1 21 In fact, the American Bar Association, while
asserting that the client must make any decisions fundamental to
his affairs, recognizes that control over the strategy of the repre-
116 See, e.g., Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. RED. 539, 541 (1949); Wade,
supra note 83, at 131; accord MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmmTY EC 4-1 (1976)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
"' See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
120 See Becker, supra note 98, at 38-39; see also Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's
Interest, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1078, 1080 (1979) (while the client holds certain preconceived
preferences when seeking legal advice, "[h]e ha[d] no decision before he sees his lawyer").
According to one commentator, the symbol of absolute control is not realistic because the
client reserves some measure of judgment. Becker, supra, at 42. Others assert that the legal
profession merely pays lip service to the idea of client control over the relationship. See
Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making
and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RE-
SEARCH J. 1003, 1003. Indeed, in many instances the client is not able to ascertain what he
needs, and must rely on the attorney's advice. See Hanley & Grunberg, supra note 95, at
197 (editorial commentary); Lehman, supra, at 1080-81. Moreover, the client is often una-
ware of the attorney's action on his behalf simply because he is normally absent when the
lawyer is acting for him. See Spiegel, supra note 101, at 49 n.31.
121 See, e.g., A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmICS 126 (1980)
(technical maneuvering tends to alienate clients from participating in their representation);
Caplan, Lawyers and Litigants: A Cult Reviewed, in DISABLING PROFESSIONS 93, 93 (1977)
("[t]he easiest way to create a monopoly is to invent a language and procedure which will be
unintelligible to the layman").
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sentation must lie with the lawyer.122 Furthermore, those commen-
tators who favor greater client participation in the decisionmaking
process demonstrate by implication that the current system is
geared toward decisionmaking by the attorney.12 3
Conceding the de facto control exercised by an attorney, the
theoretical issue is the proper degree of control a lawyer may exer-
cise over his client's affairs. One position holds that the attorney's
duty to represent his client zealously124 means that the attorney
should champion any lawful cause for the client.125 In this role, the
attorney does not interpose his own moral beliefs concerning what
should be done for the client.1 28 Rather, the client takes the law-
yer's advice concerning the likely legal consequences of various op-
122 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.2 (Proposed Draft 1983), re-
printed in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 3 (Aug. 16, 1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE, supra
note 116, EC 7-7. The decisions clearly within the control of the client are, in a civil case,
whether to accept a settlement and, in a criminal case, whether to accept a plea bargain. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 116, EC 7-7; MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 1.2 comment. Theoreti-
cally, the distinction is between ends and means; the client sets the objectives and the attor-
ney chooses the means to achieve them. See MODEL RULES, supra, Rule 1.2 comment. In
practice, however, the demarcation is not nearly so clear. For example, counsel in a civil case
may refuse to call a witness if the attorney believes the testimony would be detrimental to
the client's case, despite the client's protests to the contrary. See, e.g., Nahhas v. Pacific
Greyhound Lines, 192 Cal. App. 2d 145, 146, 13 Cal. Rptr. 299, 300 (1961); State v. Pratts,
145 N.J. Super. 79, 88-89, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d
928 (1976). Clients are often uncertain of their exact objectives when they consult an attor-
ney, and, therefore, their ends will largely be defined by what the attorney tells them they
can achieve. Spiegel, supra note 101, at 102. In practical terms, the extent to which the
attorney makes essential decisions depends on who the client is. See Mazor, Power and
Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1120, 1138 (1968). "A law-
yer may hesitate to take a step before consulting his large corporation client that he would
take on his own responsibility for a client who had wandered into his office." Id.
123 See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 101, at 140.
124 See MODEL CODE, supra note 116, EC 7-1.
121 See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 121, at 90. Professor Freedman argues that the duty of
zealous advocacy requires an attorney knowingly to allow his client in a criminal trial to
commit perjury in response to the attorney's direct examination if the client so insists.
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hard-
est Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1475-78 (1966). Contra MODEL CODE, supra note 116,
EC 7-5 (1976) (attorney cannot "knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct").
Therefore, attorneys who subscribe to this position will, under certain conditions, have to
help their clients champion unlawful causes.
126 Professor Freedman, concluding that professionalism and decency may coexist,
posits that the point at which the lawyer must make a personal moral choice is at the time
he decides whether to represent a particular client. Freedman, Lawyer and Client: Personal
Responsibility in a Professional System, in THE RoscoE PouND-AmEaucAN TRIAL LAwYERs
FOUNDATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTIE EARL WAREN CONFERENCE ON
ADvoCACY IN THE UNITED STATES: ETHICS AND ADvOCACY 56 (1978).
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tions and then directs his counsel to pursue the chosen course.""
The argument is made that if an attorney makes moral judgments
in directing his client's affairs, rather than simply pursuing the cli-
ent's legal rights, the attorney will distort the adversary process by
effectively usurping the function of judicial and legislative of-
ficers.128 Instead, the lawyer should assume the role of mechanic
guiding his client through a technical maze the client could not
effectively navigate by himself.129 Critics charge this portrayal
reduces the role of the legal counselor to finding loopholes and act-
ing as a "mouthpiece."' 30
The alternative point of view posits that an attorney must as-
sert some control in the client's decisionmaking process."3' Indeed,
one scholar envisions an attorney and client haggling over their po-
sitions until they reach a tacit common ground upon which the
representation can proceed in an atmosphere of trust.13 2 Others
urge that even without a radical alteration in the current system of
advocacy, a lawyer must assert his ethical concerns in client deci-
sionmaking.'i s Concluding that attorneys' roles as professionals
127 See id.
128 See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 121, at 96; Freedman, supra note 126, at 1482.
129 See Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH.
L. RE V. 1485, 1491 (1966). In response to Professor Freedman's contention that a criminal
defense attorney may be required to allow his client's perjury, one author argues that Freed-
man had defined the role of lawyers as that of "moral automatons." Id. at 1492.
'3 Noonan, supra note 129, at 1491. By conveying the impression that a lawyer is never
essential in deciding the proper course of action for a client, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, it has been argued, portrays attorneys as lackeys searching for loopholes to
satisfy their clients' demands. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 151 (1978).
Other professions do not paint a similar image of their members. Id.
131 See, e.g., A. GOLDMAN, supra note 121, at 127 (view that calls for client moral auton-
omy is inadequate to consider the moral autonomy of others); G. HAZARD, supra note 130, at
151 (attorney is an "actor" when he gives legal advice and is to be held accountable there-
for); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 29, 132 (under proposed "principle of non-professional advocacy," client should
expect opposition when his objectives conflict with those of the attorney).
132 See Simon, supra note 131, at 133. The principle of non-professional advocacy does
not require that the lawyer and client always agree. Id. Rather, "non-professional advocacy
should ... increase the client's concern for the impact of his conduct on others, and...
enlarge the minimal role which norms such as reciprocity and community now play in attor-
ney-client decisions." Id.
133 See, e.g., Noonan, supra note 129, at 1492. An attorney, Noonan argues, cannot deny
his own role in society by hiding behind the perceived boundaries of the adversary system
and acting out "a technician's role." Id. Simply because our system of justice is adversarial
in nature does not mean that participants may justify actions that suppress the truth:
"[T]he lawyer must act with regard for the requirements of the adversary system and with
concern for his own standards as a human person, as well as with regard for the require-
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cannot justify measuring their actions by a different moral stan-
dard from the rest of mankind,"" Professor Goldman asserted that
divorcing the lawyer from moral concerns in the interest of pro-
tecting the moral autonomy of the client may well promote im-
moral results.135 He argued that "the client may in fact lose his
own sense of moral responsibility when he sees his most partisan
interest warmly embraced and given institutional respectability by
his lawyer."' 1'36 If the client were required to justify his moral posi-
tion to his lawyer, the issue of moral responsibility would likely be
addressed. 137 Without a discussion of moral issues between attor-
ney and client, however, each can rely on his role in the relation-
ship to rationalize their joint failure to consider the effect of their
actions on others. Under Goldman's hypothesis, lawyers would re-
spect their own moral autonomy by refusing to act in a manner
that would impinge upon the rights of third parties in the guise of
zealous representation of their clients. 3 "
By ignoring the opportunity to exercise control over the client
in the face of a credible threat, not only does the lawyer risk harm
to the third party, but he also allows his client to act in a manner
clearly at odds with the client's best interests.' 39 In theory, then,
the attorney achieves the greatest good for all involved if he pre-
ments of the society which the system serves." Id.
'" Professionals often defend against charges of misconduct by arguing they must ad-
here to unique professional norms that set them apart from others in society. See, e.g.,
Freedman, supra note 126, at 1475-78 (because of the strictures of the adversary system,
attorneys must sometimes engage in what would be akin to subornation of perjury for a
nonlawyer). One author posits that the right to be judged by specialized standards applies
to people in "strongly differentiated" roles. A. GOLDMAN, supra note 121, at 2. Judges' roles,
he explains, are strongly role-differentiated because they should subordinate their personal
moral beliefs in an effort to apply the law strictly. Id. at 49. Attorneys, however, are not
entitled to this type of special deference.
135 A. GOLDMAN, supra note 121, at 126.
1386 Id.
137 Id.; accord Lehman, supra note 120, at 1081 (lawyers who fail to perform critical
examination of their clients' grievances are acting contrary to clients' interests); Simon,
supra note 131, at 135 (questioning client about the propriety of his objectives is likely to
"enhance the client's understanding of his own ends").
13 See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 121, at 132-33. The mode of advocacy developed by
Goldman does not demand that attorneys refuse to represent clients whose morals they do
not accept, as this might relegate extremely unpopular individuals or causes to a limited
pool of legal resources. See id. at 133. Rather, lawyers operating under this concept are
obliged only to avoid trammeling the moral rights of others in pursuit of their clients' goals.
See id.
I'9 Cf. supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (patient benefits when a psychiatrist
prevents a criminal act).
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vents the consummation of his client's threat.
It is submitted, therefore, that attorneys not only have a great
deal of control over their clients as a practical matter, but they are
also conceptually justified in exerting control at times to protect
the interests of parties outside the relationship. 40 If, then, it can
be proved that an attorney had the ability to exercise control over
his client, in addition to the other elements of a duty to warn, he
should be held to owe a duty to third parties injured by his fail-
ure. 41 The ability to control a client's affairs need not rise to the
level of physical control that a parent has over a child; the degree
of control simply must be sufficient to require him to act in the
client's best interests and override the client's own desires if neces-
sary. 42 In other words, even if the client refused to pay heed to the
attorney, the attorney still has the ability to control the client's
actions indirectly; that is to say, through a warning or other rea-
sonable precaution.
In addition to the ability to assert control, the lawyer would
have to receive an economic benefit for his services, 143 and he
would have to know of the need to exert his ability to control in
'40 Although the duty to control the client's conduct within the scope of the representa-
tion will inure to the benefit of the threatened party, the warning is entirely in accord with
the lawyer's duty to act in his client's best interests, since it reduces the likelihood that the
client will act to his own detriment. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text; cf.
Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics, and Professional Responsibility, 33 ALB. L. Rv.
92, 101 (1968) (no ethical problem exists when attorney breaches confidences to reveal cli-
ent's intended suicide, since client is really pleading for help and hoping to be stopped).
141 In considering whether attorneys have the ability to control their clients sufficiently
to impose a duty to take affirmative measures to protect others, it is helpful to contrast
relationships that have not been deemed special. In Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu,
61 Hawaii 253, 602 P.2d 532 (1979), the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that no special
relationship was created between the city and the person harmed by a criminal defendant
who had been acquitted and conditionally released. Id. at 257, 602 P.2d at 536-38. The court
held that "past prosecution and knowledge of [the released person's] suspected involvement
in a new offense do not create a special relationship of the nature that would impose a duty
upon the City." Id. at 257, 602 P.2d at 536. In Mangeris v. Gordon, 94 Nev. 400, 580 P.2d
481 (1978) (per curiam), the decedent cabdriver had driven a man to a massage parlor. Id. at
401, 580 P.2d at 482. The decedent later picked up the same passenger, who subsequently
killed him. Id. According to the court, plaintiff's allegation that defendants, owners of the
massage parlor, knew the passenger was a dangerous fugitive and nevertheless failed to re-
port him to the police was not substantial enough to find a special relationship. Id. at 402,
580 P.2d at 483. It is suggested that in neither Mangeris nor Seibel did the party charged
possess a peculiar ability to control the other sufficient to impose a duty to protect third
parties.
42 Cf. supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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the given instance.144 Lastly, to transform a right to warn into a
duty to warn, the attorney should have learned of the threat in the
course of his representation so that it falls within the ambit of his
fiduciary obligations.
Nevertheless, the objection remains that attorneys are not
trained to determine when their clients will pose a danger to an-
other, and, thus, they can never actually know when they must ex-
ercise their ability to control their client's affairs by providing a
warning. 145 The standard enunciated by the Tarasoff court de-
mands that "[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the
standards of his profession should determine, that his patient
presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obli-
gation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger."1 46 The inclusion of a "should have known" require-
ment marks one of the principal points of attack upon the Tarasoff
holding.1 47 As explained in Justice Mosk's separate opinion, the
psychotherapeutic professions vigorously deny an ability to predict
violence accurately.1 48 Justice Mosk argued that the duty to warn
1" See supra note 94 and accompanying text. In the analogous special relationship of
control between a parent and child, the parent cannot be held liable for failing to exercise
control unless it is proven that the parent knew or should have known of the need to exer-
cise his or her control over the child. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316(b) (1965).
45 Liability for failure to use reasonable care to protect third parties from a person
over whom one has control should not be imposed on the basis of the control alone; the
party with the control must have knowledge that the person is likely to harm another. See
Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ind. App. 1981); see also infra note 149
and accompanying text.
16 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (emphasis added).
147 See, e.g., Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 708, 669 P.2d 41, 48, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 812-13 (1983) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) ("should have known" stan-
dard incorrectly assumes that psychotherapists can predict dangerousness of an individual
the same way doctors can determine physical disorder); S. HALLECK, LAW IN THE PRACTICE
OF PSYCHATRY 80 (1980) (Tarasoff presumes professional expertise in an area where such
expertise does not exist); Roth & Meisel, supra note 15, at 509 (psychiatrists who warn may
be liable for defamation and invasion of privacy).
"148 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 451, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). The holding in Tarasoff has "galvanized the psychiatric profession into
efforts to educate courts and legislatures about the limits of psychiatrists' capacity to assure
public safety." Merton, supra note 12, at 275; see, e.g., Sloan & Klein, supra note 13, at 68
(a workable standard for predicting future violent conduct has not been formulated); Recent
Case, Torts-Duty to Act for Protection of Another-Liability of Psychotherapist for Fail-
ure to Warn of Homicide Threatened by Patient, 28 VAN. L. REv. 631, 638 (1975) (unrea-
sonable for Tarasoff court to analogize to duty of doctor to warn of a contagious disease
since disease can be diagnosed but future violence cannot be predicted); see also Murel v.
Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 365 n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari) ("predictions of dangerous behavior ... are incredibly inaccurate")
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was proper in instances where there had been an actual prediction
of violence. 149 He declared that a "should have known" standard
"will take us from the world of reality into the wonderland of clair-
voyance."'' 0  Cases following Tarasoff, however, indicate that
courts, apparently accepting the inability of therapists to predict
dangerousness without some concrete indicator of violent behavior,
are looking for actual knowledge of dangerousness before imposing
liability for failure to warn."1
Their inability to predict, however, has not relieved therapists
of the duty to warn.1 52 Instead, they are held to the standard of a
reasonable member of that profession.1 53 In this regard, it is argued
(quoting Bruce J. Ennis, Staff Attorney of the New York Civil Liberties Union and Director
of the Civil Liberties and Mental Illness Project); cf. von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal
Conduct and Preventative Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717, 725-
26 (1972) (lack of clear legal standard of dangerousness allows psychiatrists to commit pa-
tients on the basis of their personal predilections). The only indication of future dangerous-
ness that offers any degree of reliability is past violent conduct. See D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOL-
OGY AND LAW 139 (1980); Derschowitz, Preventative Confinement: A Suggested Framework
for Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1277, 1313 (1973); Comment, supra note 10, at
942 (quoting Kozol, Boucher & Garafalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,
18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 384 (1973)); accord McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466,
482, 403 A.2d 500, 508 (Law Div. 1979) (psychotherapist cannot predict dangerousness per-
fectly, but an opinion can be formed from "the history of the patient and the course of
treatment").
"9 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
5I Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
151 Compare Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 723, 415 A.2d 625, 630 (1980) (patient
did not reveal his intent to kill another to psychiatrist); and Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20,
25-26 (Minn. 1982) (dictum) (no duty to warn because patient made no specific threat); and
Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Mo. 1983) (Tarasoff and McIntosh distinguished
because plaintiff did not allege that defendants knew patient represented a threat to the
particular victim); with Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 303, 335 N.W.2d 481, 490 (1983)
(note from aunt in patient's file indicated he had been threatening his mother, therefore
mother was identifiable victim to psychiatrist); and McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super.
466, 477-78, 403 A.2d 500, 506 (Law Div. 1979) (plaintiff's expert at trial opined that dan-
gerousness was not "a prediction, but a known fact"). But see Mavroudis v. Superior Court,
102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (1980) (Tarasoff "should have known"
standard reaffirmed).
182 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26; Ayres &
Holbrook, supra note 63, at 685.
153 See, e.g., Tarasoff, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25;
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 482, 403 A.2d 500, 508 (Law Div. 1979); see also
Ayres & Holbrook, supra note 63, at 686 (psychotherapists do not have to predict with
scientific accuracy as long as they are only held to standards of their profession); Note,
Psychiatrists' Duty to the Public: Protection from Dangerous Patients, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
1103, 1120-22 (uncertainty of psychiatric prediction does not obviate duty, it should be
weighed only in establishing a diagnostic standard of care).
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that psychotherapists are little better equipped than average lay-
men to predict dangerousness.'" Thus, it is submitted that attor-
neys confronted with a threat of violence would be able to discern
its credibility as accurately as a psychotherapist would in the same
situation.155 Even assuming psychotherapists are better able to rec-
ognize potential dangerousness than are attorneys, attorneys would
still only be held to the standards of reasonable members of the
legal profession. In other words, attorneys would not become insur-
ers of the conduct of their clients; they would be required only to
exercise that degree of control over their clients that they actually
possess. 56 Therefore, it is suggested that if an attorney learned of
his client's threat to kill or injure another, and a reasonable attor-
ney in the same circumstances would find the threat credible, the
attorney then has reason to know he should act to prevent harm to
the third person, and his special relationship of control should be
considered to impose upon him a duty to act.
Confronted with the possibility of a duty to warn, attorneys
will undoubtedly attempt to shield themselves with the profes-
sion's mandate of confidentiality in attorney-client relations. 157
'4 See, e.g., Arons, supra note 106, at 75 (citing Laves & Cohen, A Preliminary Inves-
tigation into the Knowledge and Attitudes Toward the Legal Rights of Mental Patients, 1
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 49, 51 (1973)) (psychiatrists are not able to predict dangerousness "any
better than the judges and lawyers who have sought the psychiatrist's expert advice"); Ennis
& Litwack, supra note 107, at 696 ("there is little or no evidence that psychiatrists are more
'expert' in making the predictions relevant to civil commitment than laymen").
155 See Sloan & Klein, supra note 13, at 71-72.
18 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. In the analogous context of the psychia-
trist-patient relationship, one court made clear that Tarasoff-type liability should not be
without limits. See Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 766 (Iowa 1981). In Cole, the plaintiff
was convicted for the murder of her ex-husband. Id. at 768. One of the theories of her action
against her psychiatrist was that, under Tarasoff, he had breached a duty to her by failing
to warn her victim that she posed a danger of harm to him. Id. at 767. The court rejected
this argument, noting that, even if the Tarasoff doctrine was adopted in that jurisdiction,
the duty under Tarasoff runs only to the intended victim, not to the patient." Id. at 768.
11, In the interest of promoting full disclosure by the client to his counsel, attorney-
client communications are privileged. See C. McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 205 (3d ed. 1984); 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at
547-50 (3d ed. 1940). A privilege, unlike an evidentiary rule of exclusion, operates to keep
relevant material from the trier of the facts in an effort to protect relationships deemed to
have great social significance. See McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evi-
dence, 16 Tnx. L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938). Therefore, the revelation of client confidences by
an attorney is strictly proscribed. See MODEL CODE, supra note 116, DR 4-101(b) (1976). For
a discussion of the generally accepted elements of the privilege, see UNIF. R. Evm. 26, re-
printed in C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 87, at 206-07 n.10.
Long before Tarasoff, one author argued that psychiatrists should have an unqualified
privilege due to their special need to protect confidence. Slovenko, supra note 29, at 184.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:492
Citing an attorney's dual obligations of confidentiality and zealous
representation, one commentator contended that lawyers trapped
in a "Tarasoff bind" should not be faced with the same duties to
reveal as psychotherapists. 55 One long-standing exception to an
attorney's duty to keep secret his client's confidences-also present
in the physician-patient context'59-allows an attorney to expose
the client's intention to commit a future crime. 10 Nevertheless,
this exception provides only that an attorney has an ethical right
to reveal a future crime; it does not impose a duty to disclose the
intended crime.' 61 It is submitted, however, that the duty to warn
is narrower in scope than the future crimes exception. Although
there is considerable controversy over the breadth of the future
crimes exception,'162 the duty to warn is clearly narrower, since it is
This assertion remains one of the primary bases for attempting to discredit the Tarasoff
holding. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 458-60, 551 P.2d at 358-60, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38-40
(Clark, J., dissenting); Sloan & Klein, supra note 13, at 58, 65 (Tarasoff inappropriately
converted what was a therapist's option to disclose into duty); Stone, supra note 15, at 374
(therapists' pre-Tarasoff right to decide issues of confidentiality provided adequate protec-
tion to third parties).
158 See Merton, supra note 12, at 284. Except in extreme circumstances, Professor
Merton states she would not reveal her client's threat for fear of increasing the client's
chances for conviction. Id. at 331.
159 See AMA, CANONS OF MEDicAL EHics § 9 (1959), reprinted in Ayres & Holbrook,
supra note 63, at 692 n.45. It has been suggested that this exception should only be applica-
ble in the event there is a distinct danger to the safety of third parties. See Note, supra note
89, at 209; Note, supra note 153, at 1125.
160 See MODEL CODE, supra note 116, DR 4-101(C)(3); MODEL RULES, supra note 122,
Rule 1.6(b)(1). In a formal opinion, the American Bar Association has determined that the
future crimes exception should be read to require the attorney to disclose only when he has
facts that lead him to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that his client will commit a crime.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965); accord Note, The Application
of the Tarasoff Duty to Forensic Psychiatry, 66 VA. L. REv. 715, 725 n.61 (1980).
161 The language of the future crimes exception makes clear that disclosure of such an
intent is discretionary, stating that "[a] lawyer may reveal." MODEL CODE, supra note 116,
DR 4-101(C) (emphasis added). In an analogous situation, howev'er, it has been argued that
the dangerous patient exception to psychiatrist-patient confidentiality in California can be
taken as evidence of a legislative intent to require the psychiatrist to speak out when he
learns of a threat to a third party. See Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1063. "If the
need for the therapist's evidence is deemed so high as to deny him a privilege in the court-
room, there is all the more reason to release him from his bond of confidentiality when he
must act, if at all, instantly." Id. But see Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 723, 415 A.2d
625, 630 (1980) (if privilege applies in judicial proceedings, no lesser standard should be
expected outside those proceedings).
Professor Merton has noted that, following Tarasoff, there was an unsuccessful attempt
to burden attorneys with a "mandatory obligation," rather than a "discretionary power" to
expose confidences of a client when done to protect a third party. Merton, supra note 12, at
284.
162 Compare MODEL CODE, supra note 116, DR 4-101(C)(3) with MODEL RuLEs, supra
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addressed only toward threats of imminent physical harm.163 It is
suggested that a duty is justified in such instances because a con-
summated threat of serious physical harm can never be adequately
redressed, while effective remedies do exist to compensate a victim
of most non-violent crimes. Therefore, since principled grounds for
a legal duty to reveal or warn can be enunciated on the basis of an
attorney's special relationship of control,16 4 the ethical constraint
of confidentiality should be overcome.16 5
CONCLUSION
To the extent that any duty to warn threatened third parties
is embraced, the gap between legal duties and commonly accepted
moral obligations is narrowed. As applied to the psychotherapeutic
community, recent cases interpreting the duty to warn represent
reasoned extensions of liability based upon prior case law and the
traditional tort concept of foreseeability. In addition, a proper ex-
plication of the special relationship created between a therapist
and patient lies in the ability to control the patient's affairs that is
conferred upon the therapist by his fiduciary status. Under this
type of special relationship, members of other professions, particu-
larly attorneys, may also be subject to affirmative legal obligations.
Because of their position of trust, attorneys should shoulder re-
sponsibility for the harmful actions of their clients if they neglect
to exercise their ability to control the client for the good of others.
Thomas J. Murphy
note 122, Rule 1.6(B)(1). The future crimes exception, as stated in the old ABA Model
Code, provides:
A lawyer may reveal:
The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
MODEL CODE, supra note 116, DR 4-101(C)(3). The ABA's proposed Model Rules permit
disclosure only when necessary to prevent "imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
MODEL RULES, supra note 122, Rule 1.6(b)(1). The new rules, however, have not received
widespread acceptance among the states.
163 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
"6 See supra notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
"I' See Note, supra note 1, at 1440 n.57; see also McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super.
466, 491-92, 403 A.2d 500, 513 (Law Div. 1979) (concerns of confidentiality are not suffi-
ciently important to override the duty to protect the victim); accord Comment, supra note
10, at 948 (arguments for breaching patient's confidence are more forceful "where there is
still a possibility of averting a tragedy").
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